Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] . How the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many aspects.
The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the next year to five years.
Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by small stub/entetprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet routing is threatened by unprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see Section 5. 
RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation tool such as rcynic.
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Expires Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other validated caches. An operator should take maximum advantage of this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI database.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI data, operators will likely want border routers to have one or more nearby caches.
For redundancy, a router may peer with more than one cache at the same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is recommended.
If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and peer with of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g. customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no ROAs to be Invalid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP MAY wish to have private RPKI for that space with its own trust anchor.
Operators issuing ROAs may have 'lazy' customers who announce into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though the work to manage their own certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI data for the lazy customer just as they provision many other things for them.
Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy validation capable border routers.
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Internet-Draft RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation January 2011 eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical received announcements should be considered in partial deployment.
Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] . How this is used in routing is specified by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to illadvised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, will likely be prevalent for a long time.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy should not be overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and giving very low preference to, but still using, Invalid announcements.
Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an invalid announcement to valid or better. The data plane may not follow the control plane.
Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Section 5 above.
IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
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